Introduction
A key role of …nancial intermediaries is to provide liquidity -essentially, on-demand access to cash -to their investors. Typically, …nancial intermediaries that provide liquidity also engage in maturity transformation. For example, banks issue long-term loans but grant their depositors the right to withdraw their funds on demand. Similarly, open-end mutual funds ("funds") that invest in comparatively illiquid securities, such as corporate bonds, give their investors the option of redeeming their shares in cash every day. Daily redemptions allow fund investors to insure against their liquidity needs while participating in the higher return their fund earns on less liquid assets. At the same time, funds need to adequately insure the residual liquidity risk that they incur.
1 Insu¢ ciently insured liquidity risk can trigger and amplify …nancial crises.
In this paper, we assess the e¤ect of swing pricing -a tool for managing liquidity risk in funds, which several types of US funds will be able to use from November 2018 onwards.
2 Swing pricing permits a fund to pay out less than net asset value (NAV 3 ) per share when net redemptions are large. It thereby alleviates a situation in which the fund, in the absence of swing pricing, would have to sell assets at a large discount to generate su¢ cient cash to pay out its redeeming shareholders. Symmetrically, swing pricing allows the fund to raise the price per share above the NAV per share when the fund experiences large net in ‡ows. It can thus help to ensure that the costs associated with purchasing additional assets are borne by incoming investors. If investors anticipate that the fund will settle share transactions above the NAV when net demand for its shares is high, and below the NAV when net demand is negative, swing pricing can help reduce the volatility of ‡ows into and out of the fund. Our model builds on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin (1997) . We derive an optimal rule for adjusting the single price at which a fund settles both share redemptions and subscriptions (the "settlement price"). The settlement price in our model summarises a range of contract features that in practice the fund can o¤er to its investors: for example, a higher settlement price could also correspond to faster settlement of redemption requests or more generous maximum daily redemption amounts.
In our model, we assume that investors can either purchase assets or invest indirectly in those assets by purchasing fund shares. There is a large number of small funds whose managers maximise their investors' utility. At the time the fund is set up, fund managers commit to a rule whereby they set the settlement price. (In practice, the fund discloses the general terms of its swing pricing policy in its prospectus.) Fund managers take into account that investors might become cash constrained, prompting them to redeem their shares earlier than they expected and independently of the settlement price. The higher the settlement price, the more investors obtain if they turn out to be cash constrained, at the expense of those who stay with the fund.
In this context, three parameters determine the optimal settlement price: the cost of trading in the asset market; the likelihood with which investors become cash constrained; and the degree of investor risk aversion. Their impact is best understood against the background of the optimal investment contract. This contract entails investors receiving less when they need to redeem their shares early than if they hold onto their shares until the fund's assets mature. Thus, even if the return of the fund's assets was certain, the return of an investment in fund shares is risky because the investor is uncertain whether he will have to redeem his shares early. Risk-averse investors dislike this uncertainty. The bene…t of raising the settlement price for early redemptions is that investors'payo¤s become less volatile. The fund manager balances these bene…ts with the larger costs he incurs when selling assets to serve redemption requests.
of insurance: an outcome that households would be unable to achieve if they invested directly in …nancial markets. The deposit payout corresponds to the settlement price of fund shares in our model. The optimal deposit payout itself depends on parameters such as households'risk aversion and the likelihood of them requiring immediate access to their deposits. The same factors in ‡uence the optimal settlement price in our model. The key di¤erence between the two contracts is that the settlement price is allowed to depend on net redemption requests. The fund manager can commit to setting the settlement price su¢ ciently low to discourage redemptions even if each fund investor believes that a large share of other fund investors will redeem their shares. In contrast, promised deposit payouts are independent of the amount of deposits withdrawn, making a bank vulnerable to self-ful…lling runs. Jacklin (1987) showed that equity contracts can achieve the same liquidity risk sharing as deposit contracts while being immune to runs. Sales of equity shares correspond to redemptions in our model, and the dividend payout plays a similar role to the settlement price. Similar to deposit contracts, equity contracts promise a dividend payout that is independent of aggregate liquidity needs. However, the price at which shareholders can sell their shares, and hence their level of consumption, depends on the aggregate amount of dividend payouts relative to the aggregate amount of shares sold. The more shares that are sold (the larger redemptions, in our model), the lower the price, and the lower the incentive to sell equity shares (to redeem fund shares, in our model). These welfare-optimal deposit and equity contracts are only feasible if households cannot invest directly in the assets the intermediary holds. Otherwise, as eg Jacklin (1987) shows, …nancial intermediaries cannot o¤er contracts that provide their investors with a higher level of utility than if households invested directly in …nancial markets. The reason is that any di¤erence in payo¤s would be exploited by arbitrage trades. Correspondingly, we show that if there are no trading frictions in the asset market, the fund optimally sets the settlement price equal to the market value of its assets per share (the fund's NAV per share).
Von Thadden (1998 Thadden ( , 1999 derives an optimal deposit contract in the presence of investment frictions. The in ‡uence of such frictions is also the main interest of this paper. Von Thadden's context is di¤erent: in his model, households cannot trade assets but can liquidate them, against a loss, and then start a new investment project. Despite this di¤erence, we …nd that the same factors that matter for the optimal deposit contract also determine optimal settlement prices and the optimal size of the fund's liquidity bu¤er in our model: the size of the frictions, the likelihood with which investors become cash constrained, and the degree of investor risk aversion. Lewrick and Schanz (2017) empirically investigate the impact of swing pricing on the ‡ows, the liquidity bu¤er, and the pro…tability of open-end mutual funds. In that paper, we also provide a stylised partial-equilibrium model to motivate our estimation hypotheses. Other than that, we are not aware of any other papers that model swing pricing. However, the risk of runs on mutual funds, which swing pricing might mitigate, has been investigated in the recent theoretical and empirical literature. Chen et al (2010) , Goldstein et al (forthcoming) and Zheng (2016) show how an incomplete allocation of liquidation costs to those investors redeeming their shares can give rise to a run on an open-end investment fund. Malik and Lindner (2017) discuss whether swing pricing might reduce systemic risk. They suggest measuring the e¤ect of swing pricing by its ability to dampen the impact of large out ‡ows on the fund's NAV. Speci…cally, they compare changes in the NAV with out ‡ows during normal and stressed periods of funds that implemented swing pricing with those that did not. They …nd some suggestive evidence for swing pricing to be e¤ective in a small sample of funds. In Lewrick and Schanz (2017) , we employ a related method to compare the performance of funds that were allowed to use swing pricing with that of funds not permitted to swing settlement prices. We show that swing pricing dampens out ‡ows in response to weak fund performance, but has a limited e¤ect during stress episodes. Furthermore, swing pricing supports fund returns while raising the volatility of fund share prices, and may incentivise funds to hold less cash. We compare some of these …ndings with our predictions in section 6.
Framework
Our modeling framework is based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , extended by an asset market, in which households can directly trade the assets the fund invests in. Our economy has three periods, t = 0; 1; 2 and two types of agents: households and open-end investment funds.
At date 0, each household is endowed with one unit of a physical good. There are no other goods or endowments. The good, which serves as the numeraire, can be stored for one period in both periods 0 and 1, yielding a gross return of 1 after one period. In this sense, it can be thought of as cash. But it is a real good that also serves as an input to a long-term investment opportunity at date 0. This investment has constant returns to scale, is arbitrarily divisible and yields a certain gross return of R at date 2. It cannot be liquidated early, but agents can issue and trade claims (equity contracts) on their investment's payo¤ at date 1 in a competitive "asset" market at price p. These claims are risk-free and pay R per unit of investment at date 2.
There are initially two types of households: a fraction of households is risk neutral; the remainder is risk averse. We will focus on an equilibrium in which at date 0 only risk-averse households invest in funds: these households value the fund's smoothing of investment returns. Risk-neutral households are potential trading partners for the funds and may decide to subscribe to fund shares at date 1. They have identical preferences over future consumption of the good given by u N = c 2 . Risk-averse households' preferences, u A , are given by
u (c 1 ) with probability u (c 2 ) with probability 1
where the utility function u is twice continuously di¤erentiable in consumption, increasing, strictly concave, and satis…es Inada conditions. represents the probability of being subject to a liquidity shock. This shock determines whether the household is "impatient" and needs to consume at date 1, or "patient"and consumes at date 2. The households'individual shocks materialise at date 1, are identically distributed, and satisfy the Law of Large Numbers. Hence, there is no uncertainty about aggregate consumption needs nor about prices. As standard in this literature (eg von Thadden (1999) ), the utility function represents the simplifying case where agents consume only once in their lives. Individual consumption needs are private information. Therefore, if agents interact, type-dependent consumption allocations must be incentive compatible. Households decide in period zero how to invest their endowment (storage or the long-term technology) and, at date 1, whether to issue claims on the long-term technology or subscribe to or redeem investment fund shares. For simplicity, we allow households to only hold either fund shares or invest in the long-term technology but not both.
Investment funds do not have own endowments but issue shares to households. They are small and take the market price as given when considering whether to trade in the asset market. For simplicity, we do not allow them also to issue debt. Each fund manager aims to maximise the aggregate utility of those households that invest in fund shares at date 0: that is, we abstract from agency con ‡icts between the fund manager and the fund's shareholders. This simpli…es the comparison of our results with those of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin (1987) ; their justi…cation -that competing fund managers can attract investors only if they best serve investors'interests -also applies here.
Each fund manager chooses an investment contract (the fund's "investment prospectus"). This contract speci…es the fraction ! 0 of the proceeds from share issuance, S 0 , that the fund invests at date 0 in storage rather than in the long-term technology (the fund's "liquidity bu¤er"). It also describes how s 1 , the price at which the fund settles requests for share issuance and redemptions at date 1, and s 2 the payout per share to investors at date 2, depend on the number of fund shares that households wish to redeem or acquire at date 1. Because the entire wealth of the fund is distributed to its investors at the end of period 2, s 2 is equal to the fund's assets per share at that time and determined by the fund's choice of s 1 . Our focus is therefore on the fund's choice of s 1 , which we refer to as the fund's settlement price. In practice, a fund's prospectus would express s 1 as a "swing factor" in relation to the mid-market price of the fund's assets, p:
Accordingly, a positive swing factor corresponds to a settlement price below the unswung net asset value. Both expressions are equivalent in our model because there is no aggregate uncertainty, so the market price is known. We normalise the number of shares the fund issues at date 0 to one per share. Thus, s 1 is equal to the consumption of a household that purchases a fund share at date 0 and redeems it at date 1, while s 2 is its consumption if it redeems its share at date 2. At date 1, the fund purchases (or sells) claims on the long-term technology to invest proceeds from net share issuance (or to obtain su¢ cient amounts of the good to settle redemption requests).
Trading claims is costly. These costs are represented by a bid-ask spread [(1 ) p; p= (1 )] around the mid-market price p. That is, a seller of one claim receives (1 ) p, whereas a buyer of a claim pays p= (1 ). Figure 1 summarises the timeline of the model. 
First best
As a benchmark for the decentralised solution, we present the solution of a social planner's problem in this section. We assume that the planner can distinguish patient from impatient households and is able to allocate the consumption good directly to households without having to trade. The planner's objective is to maximise the weighted welfare of the two types of households,
where is the share of risk-neutral households, c N their (period-2) consumption, 1 the share of risk-averse households, c I A the (period-1) consumption of risk-averse impatient households, and c P A the (period-2) consumption of risk-averse patient households.
Lemma 1 (First best) If patient and impatient households are identi…able, and if consumption can be allocated directly to households, the welfare optimal solution is
Proof. To fund consumption of impatient households, the planner needs to store
units of the endowment good and invests the remainder in the long-term technology. This leaves (1 ! 0 ) R to be consumed by risk-neutral and patient risk-averse households, that is,
Using the resource constraint (8) to replace the consumption levels of risk-averse households in the welfare function (3) yields
The planner's problem can now be written as max c N ;c I A W . The …rst-order constraints are
Entering the …rst into the second yields the equilibrium allocation (4) -(6). In the …rst best, households consume less when impatient than when patient. This is a variant of the standard result that in the …rst best, liquidity insurance is incomplete (see eg Freixas and Rochet (2008) , chapter 2.2). The presence of risk-neutral households means that the marginal utility of risk-averse households when patient, u 0 c P A , is equal to that of (patient) risk-neutral households (= 1).
Decentralised solution
We start by presenting the decentralised solution in Section 5.1 and compare it with the …rst best described in the previous section. Section 5.2 then derives the optimal settlement price in this equilibrium and characterises the proofs for the optimal liquidity bu¤er and investment decisions at date 0.
Overview and comparison with the planner' s solution
There are two frictions that cause the decentralised solution to di¤er from the welfare optimum: …rst, markets are incomplete, because individual liquidity shocks are not publicly observable and securities contingent on these shocks cannot be traded; and second, because consumption needs to be allocated via trading in asset markets and trading is costly.
De…nition 1 A decentralised (Nash) equilibrium consists of the following:
for each household j, investment choices that maximise households'utility (u N and u A , respectively)
for each investment fund k, investment and contract choices ! 0;k ; s 1;k ; s 2;k that maximise the expected aggregate utility of the households that purchased the fund's shares A market clearing condition for traded claims on the long-term technology.
We show existence of an equilibrium in which, at date 0, risk-neutral households invest in the longterm technology whereas risk-averse households invest in fund shares; in which all agents of the same type make the same choices; in which all funds have the same size; and in which there is no trade in the asset market at date 1.
Proposition 1 (Decentralised equilibrium) There is a decentralised equilibrium with the following properties:
1. Risk-neutral households invest their endowment in the long-term technology. Risk-averse households invest their endowment in a fund's shares. If impatient, they redeem their shares at date 1 and consume. If patient, they hold onto their shares.
2. Each fund sets the settlement price at date 1 equal to
and the bounds s L , s H are given by
3. Each fund share pays out, at date 2,
4. Each fund's liquidity bu¤ er is equal to the payouts to impatient investors at date 1 (! 0 = s 1 ).
Notice that there is no trade in the asset market in this equilibrium. Nevertheless, the market price at which investors, and the fund, believe they would be able to trade needs to meet a certain condition for this equilibrium to exist. This is stated in Lemma 2. If the market price was lower than 1 , all households would prefer to store their endowment at date 0 to purchase claims on the long-term technology at date 1 in the asset market (a contradiction, because there would not be any investment in the long-term technology), despite the trading cost of . Correspondingly, if the market price exceeded 1= (1 ), all households would prefer to invest at date 0 in the long-term technology; if impatient, they would sell claims at date 1 to obtain more than 1 (a contradiction, because none would have any endowment to purchase those claims).
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, the mid-market price ful…ls
To ease the comparison with the …rst best described in Lemma 1, the following corollary to proposition 1 translates the equilibrium investment contract terms (s 1 ; s 2 ) into consumption levels for the various types of households.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, households consume
Proposition 1 illustrates how trading frictions a¤ect the fund manager's choice for the settlement price. If the optimal settlement price is su¢ ciently close to the fund's NAV, trading costs deter investors from exploiting the di¤erence between returns on the fund's share and on a direct investment in the claims on the long-term technology. The fund manager then settles net redemption requests at the unconstrained optimal solution,ŝ. It di¤ers from the …rst best only because the fund manager would incur trading costs if he sold or purchased claims on the long-term technology in the asset market. To see this, notice that (13) can be written as u 0 c
Di¤erences between …rst best consumption, determined by u 0 c I A = Ru 0 c P A , and consumption in the decentralised economy whenŝ is optimal would disappear if the trading cost was zero.
If the fund settled redemptions above s H , the fund's shares would be so expensive that patient households with fund shares would prefer to sell those shares and to invest the proceeds in claims on the long-term technology. Similarly, if the fund settled net redemptions below s L , the fund's shares would be so cheap that households that invested in the long-term technology would sell claims on their investment in order to subscribe to the fund's shares. The fund manager dislikes both situations: the former, because patient households redeeming fund shares unnecessarily incur trading costs; and the latter, because of the dilution of the fund's value induced by additional shares that are issued too cheaply. Lemma 6, below, shows that these ‡ows reduce the payo¤s of the fund's investors both if patient and if impatient.
On balance, the fund settles shares at the unconstrained optimal settlement price if this is su¢ ciently close to the fund's NAV such that trading costs deter arbitrage ‡ows. Otherwise, it chooses the settlement price closest to the unconstrained optimal price that just keeps those arbitrage-driven ‡ows at bay.
Trading frictions have both good and bad e¤ects on the welfare of risk-averse households. They open an interval, [s L ; s H ], in which the fund manager can set the settlement price with the aim of maximising his investors' utility without triggering arbitrage trades. At the same time, trading costs raise the marginal cost of raising the settlement price. Larger trading frictions therefore lower the unconstrained optimal settlement price,ŝ. The gap widens between risk-averse households'consumption when patient and impatient. The smaller the trading costs , the narrower the interval [s L ; s H ]. It shrinks to zero in the absence of trading costs. In this case, the fund manager settles shares at a price that ensures that his fund, and claims on the long-term technology, o¤er the same return (s L = s H = p = 1). Then c I A = 1, c P A = R. This is not generally equal to the …rst best allocation, which, as shown in Lemma 1, depends on households'utility function.
Derivation of the optimal settlement price for a given level of a fund' s cash bu¤er
Swing pricing enables the fund manager to set the settlement price as a function of net redemptions. We therefore de…ne net redemptions before deriving the optimal settlement price. A fund's aggregate redemption requests are the sum of requests of impatient and patient investors. Given that the likelihood of becoming impatient is , and the size of the fund (the number of shares it issued at date 0, each against one unit of the endowment) is S 0;k , its impatient investors withdraw S 0;k shares in equilibrium. We denote patient investors'net redemptions of fund k's shares by k . If k < 0, the fund experiences net subscriptions by patient investors; if k > S 0;k , these net subscriptions more than o¤set redemptions by its impatient investors. We further denote the number of shares redeemed at which the fund's liquidity bu¤er (! 0;k ) just su¢ ces to pay out redeeming shareholders by^ k , iê
In Section 5.2.1, we derive the "unconstrained" solution,ŝ k , which is optimal if only impatient households adjust their portfolios at date 1: that is, the optimal settlement price conditional on k = 0. In Section 5.2.2, we derive the "no-arbitrage bounds", s L;k and s H;k . These incentive constraints ensure that patient investors prefer not to alter their portfolio at date 1; hence by construction, k = 0 for any s 1;k 2 (s L;k ; s H;k ). Lemma 6 argues that the fund manager would not choose a settlement price outside [s L;k ; s H;k ]. This lies behind the result (12) in proposition 1. As mentioned above, we focus on a situation in which only risk-averse households invest in the fund. We derive conditions for the existence of the equilibrium in the annex (these are the date-0 participation constraints for households that make their equilibrium investment decisions optimal) and provide an example of the equilibrium for a CRRA utility function. We omit fund subscripts (k) in the following for ease of exposition.
Unconstrained solution (ŝ)
s is the solution to max s1 U s.t. = 0, where U is the fund's objective function. In an equilibrium in which only risk-averse investors invest in the fund at date 0, U = E [ũ A (c 1 ; c 2 )]. The fund manager takes the size S 0 of his fund as given when maximising U . Given that each risk-averse household purchased one share at date 0, payouts to investors at date 2, s 2 , are equal to the value of the fund's assets per share at date 2. These depend on net redemptions at date 1.
If >^ , then net redemption requests, S 0 + , exceed the fund's cash bu¤er, ! 0 S 0 , leaving it short s 1 ( S 0 + ) ! 0 S 0 < 0 units of the endowment good. Because of trading costs, the fund receives not p units of the endowment good per asset sold but only (1 ) p units. Assets per share are, at date 2,
The numerator is the fund's remaining assets after having met net redemption requests: (1 ! 0 ) S 0 from its initial investment into the long-term technology, minus date-1 sales. The denominator is the remaining number of shares in issuance after redemption requests have been settled: the number issued at date 0, S 0 , minus shares held by its …rst-period investors who turn out to be impatient, S 0 , minus net redemptions by patient investors, .
If, in contrast, <^ , net redemptions are less than the fund's cash bu¤er. The fund invests spare cash (a total of s 1 ( S 0 + ) ! 0 S 0 > 0), receiving 1 claims on the long-term technology for each p units of the endowment good spent. Assets per share are, at date 2,
Notice that assets per share, and hence date-2 payouts to investors, are strictly decreasing in the settlement price if net redemptions are positive (ie if + S 0 > 0): the more paid out per share at date 1, the fewer assets are left to back shares that are redeemed only at date 2. Correspondingly, assets per share are is strictly increasing in the settlement price if net redemptions are negative ( + S 0 < 0): the more new subscribers have to pay per share, the larger the fund's resulting assets per share.
Lemma 3 derives an expression for the "unconstrained" optimal settlement price,ŝ, ie the settlement price that is optimal conditionally on = 0.
Lemma 3 Conditionally on = 0, the optimal settlement price,ŝ, ful…lŝ
Proof. If = 0, the fund manager's objective function can be written as
The solution to the fund manager's problem is given by the …rst-order condition
where the response of the fund's date-2 payout (its assets per share at date 2) to a marginal increase in its date-1 payout (the settlement price) is
Substituting (28) into (27) yields (24).
No-arbitrage bounds (s L , s H )
Lemma 4 describes an interval for the return of an investment in fund k's shares at date 1 within which patient investors would not alter their portfolio at date 1. Deriving the interval in terms of gross returns of such an investment, s 2 =s 1 , is be simpler than deriving the interval directly for the settlement price, s 1 . The two expressions are equivalent because s 2 is a function of s 1 .
Lemma 4 If all funds set the same settlement price, then = 0 if
Proof. If all funds set the same settlement price, households that at date 0 subscribed to fund shares have no incentive to switch funds. The payo¤ of a patient household that at date 0 subscribed to fund k's share and does not change its portfolio is s 2 . If it redeemed its share and invested the proceeds in the asset market, it would earn s 1 (1 ) R=p. Thus, for the investor to remain with the fund,
The payo¤ of a patient household that at date 0 invested in the long-term technology and does not change its portfolio is R. If the household instead issued claims on the investment and used the proceeds, (1 ) p, to subscribe to the shares of a fund, it would earn (1 ) ps 2 =s 1 . Thus, for the investor to remain invested in the long-term technology,
Lemma 5 translates this return interval into an interval for the settlement price for the fund's shares.
Lemma 5 If the fund sells assets at date 1 (if ^ ), (29) holds if and only if
If the fund purchases assets at date 1 (if <^ ), (29) holds if and only if
The proof is in the annex; it uses the fact that the fund's assets per share, s 2 , are a strictly monotone function of its settlement price, and solves for the settlement prices that apply at the bounds of (29). Just as for assets per share (see (22) and (23)), a positive bid-ask spread implies a discontinuity at^ , such that the interval is de…ned separately for the case in which the fund sells or purchases assets in equilibrium. Notice that s 1j >^ exceeds the market value of a share net of transaction costs, ! 0 + (1 ! 0 ) (1 ) p. When the fund is not constrained in its choice of the optimal settlement price by arbitrage trades (ie if s 1 =ŝ), then it does not charge the entire cost of liquidation to investors redeeming their shares at date 1.
Lemma 6 states that the optimal settlement price falls within that interval.
Lemma 6 In an equilibrium in which funds are symmetric, the settlement price, s 1 , ful…ls
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that s 2 =s 1 < (1 ) R=p (implying s 1 is above the upper bound of (32)). Then the fund's patient investors would strictly prefer to redeem their shares because the return on fund k's shares would be less than the return on investments in the market. The fund would liquidate its assets, retrieving (1 ) p per unit sold. Each investor would obtain a payout of ! 0 + (1 ! 0 ) (1 ) p per share. As a result, each household with fund shares would consume, if impatient,
and
if patient, having reinvested its payout in the market. Because s 1 reaches a minimum at ! 0 +(1 ! 0 ) (1 ) p when the fund sells assets (see (32)), these consumption levels are lower than what patient and impatient households, respectively, would obtain if s 2 =s 1 (1 ) R=p. Suppose instead that s 2 =s 1 > 1 1 R=p (implying s 1 is below the lower bound of (33)). Then households that invested at date 0 in the long-term technology would strictly prefer to sell claims on their investment and use the proceeds to subscribe to fund shares. As a result, ! 1 (the fund is small relative to the share of households that would ‡ow in). Because s 1 is below the lower bound of (33), c I A < c I A . In addition, patient households would also obtain less (ie c P A < c P A ) because of dilution: the fund's assets per share would fall in response to the in ‡ows to a lower level than that implied had the settlement price been set to the lower bound of (33). To see this, notice that for all s 1j <^ in the interval (33),
That is, lim ! 1 s 2j <^ =s 1j <^ is less than the lower bound of the range of returns set in equilibrium; see (34 
Equilibrium cash bu¤er and …rst-period choices
In this section, we provide the intuition for our results for the equilibrium cash bu¤er and households' …rst-period choices. The proofs are in the annex. Consider …rst the optimal liquidity bu¤er. In order to settle net redemptions at date 1, the fund can either keep a cash bu¤er at date 0 or sell assets at date 1. Because the date-1 market price ful…ls p 2 (1 ; 1= (1 )) (see Lemma 2), the opportunity costs of investing in the cash bu¤er are lower than the trading costs the fund would incur if it had to sell assets at date 1 ( = 1= (1 )). The fund chooses the cash bu¤er with a view to avoiding transaction costs and holds just enough cash in order to settle date-1 net redemption requests. Now consider households' …rst-period choices. We are interested in an equilibrium in which riskneutral households invest in the long-term technology at date 0 and risk-averse households invest in fund shares. Two conditions need to be met for this equilibrium to exist. The …rst is that the expected return of investing in the long-term technology from date 0 to date 2 is larger than that of holding fund shares over the same horizon. This ensures that risk-neutral households, all of which are patient, invest in the long-term technology. The condition holds if the fund o¤ers investors that redeem early a return on its shares larger than that of storage, ie if s 1 > 1. This correspondingly reduces the payout of investors staying with the fund until date 2, discouraging risk-neutral households from investing in the fund. 6 The second condition is that the return on investments in fund shares has su¢ ciently lower volatility than that of investing in the long-term technology. If so, risk-averse households prefer investing in fund shares, despite their lower expected returns. In the annex, we show that these conditions are met for plausible parameterisations of the model.
Properties of the optimal settlement price
In this section, we show how the equilibrium described in proposition 1 is a¤ected if the share of liquidityconstrained investors, , and the trading costs, , rise. In Section 6.1, we assume that the new values of and are known at date 0, when the investment contract is written and the fund chooses the optimal liquidity bu¤er: ie we derive the comparative static properties of the equilibrium. In Section 6.2, we assume instead that the share of liquidity-constrained investors or of trading costs unanticipatedly increases at date 1, when it is too late for the fund to build its cash bu¤er to meet redemptions. This scenario might help understand funds'responses to sudden stress in …nancial markets. Finally, we ask whether swing pricing can mitigate the risk of self-ful…lling runs.
Comparative static properties
We express the properties of the optimal settlement price also in terms of the swing factor, which is given by the relative di¤erence between the fund's net asset value and the settlement price. Entering the equilibrium values for the liquidity bu¤er and the settlement price into (2) yields the optimal swing factor. It is strictly declining in the optimal settlement price:
We de…ne^ as the value of (40) when the no-arbitrage bounds do not constrain the fund manager, ie if s 1 =ŝ (see (13)). Lemma 7 summarises key properties of the optimal swing factor. The proofs are in the annex (Section 10.5).
Lemma 7 (Properties of the optimal swing factor and the optimal settlement price).
The optimal swing factor ful…ls
2. Larger trading costs, , widen the interval (41) and raise^ (reduceŝ), and lower the liquidity bu¤er, ! 0 .
A greater likelihood of becoming impatient, , shrinks the interval (41) and raises^ (reducesŝ).
The …rst result in Lemma 7 is the no-arbitrage interval which contains the optimal swing factor, (41). It re ‡ects the frictions induced by trading costs. But the interval is also shaped by the share of impatient investors. The larger that share, the smaller the interval. This is because, in equilibrium, only impatient investors redeem their shares. The larger their share, , the more responsive the fund's return to the settlement price. To see this, notice from (16) that that the fund's payout at date 2, s 2 , is strictly declining in . This means that when is large, a small change in the settlement price leads to a substantial change in the return of fund shares from date 1 to date 2. The no-arbitrage interval (41) shrinks, re ‡ecting that the fund manager has less scope to vary the settlement price without triggering ‡ows of patient investors. In practice, funds often commit to a maximum swing factor.
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The second result is that trading frictions widen the no-arbitrage interval. If they were zero, the interval would collapse to zero. Trading frictions also raise the marginal cost to raising the settlement price. To see this, notice that a larger makes the …rst derivative of the fund's assets per share at date 2, given by (22), more negative. This translates into a stronger decline of payouts at date 2, s 2 , in response to an increase in s 1 . As a result, larger trading frictions induce the fund manager to lower the settlement price. He thereby reduces the degree of liquidity insurance the fund provides to its investors.
Finally, notice that the optimal liquidity bu¤er inherits the properties of the optimal settlement price because the fund manager chooses to hold a su¢ ciently large bu¤er to avoid trading in the market, instead funding redemptions from the bu¤er.
Optimal settlement price following unanticipated shocks
Some events in …nancial markets can best be characterised as unanticipated, in the sense that market participants have assigned only a very small, or indeed no, probability to their occurrence. For example, few investors would have thought possible the rapid increase in long-term bond yields during the 2013 "taper tantrum", and the associated large out ‡ows from bond funds. 8 We therefore brie ‡y consider the fund's response to unancitipated increases in the share of cash-constrained investors, , and an unanticipated increase in the trading cost, , at date 1, for a given value of the fund's cash bu¤er.
Lemma 8
The optimal settlement price is declining following an unanticipated increase in the share of cash-constrained investors, , and an unanticipated increase in the trading cost, , at date 1.
An unanticipated increase in leads to an increase in redemption requests. At the equilibrium settlement price, the fund would not have enough cash to accommodate the redemption requests. It cannot sell assets to raise cash because the increase in a¤ects all funds in the same way, and impatient investors consume the endowment good received rather than reinvest it in the asset market. The fund therefore distributes the available cash among redeeming investors. The settlement price falls, raising the date-2 fund's assets per share. As a result, only impatient investors redeem their shares.
The response to an unanticipated increase in follows because the fund manager trades o¤ the marginal costs and bene…ts of raising the settlement price. The marginal costs have increased following the increase in , while the marginal bene…ts (an increase in the consumption of investors that stay with the fund) has remained unchanged. This induces the fund manager to lower the settlement price. The proof is in the annex (Section 10.6).
In Lewrick and Schanz (2017) , we …nd evidence that is consistent with these results. We compare the performance of funds that are permitted to use swing pricing with that of funds that are not, immediately following the taper tantrum. Arguably, the taper tantrum led to both an unanticipated increase in cashconstrained investors and an increase in the costs of trading. We …nd that the return of funds that are permitted to swing their settlement price on average falls less in response to net redemptions than that of funds constrained to set their settlement price equal to their net asset value.
Can swing pricing mitigate the risk of self-ful…lling runs?
The model for which Diamond and Dybvig (1983) derived the optimal deposit contract has two equilibria: the e¢ cient one, in which only impatient investors withdraw their funds at date 1, and an ine¢ cient one, in which all investors withdraw and the bank's assets are liquidated at a loss in an attempt to fund those withdrawals. As mentioned in Section 2, a key di¤erence between a deposit contract and the contract o¤ered by an open-end investment fund that uses swing pricing is that the fund manager can …x the settlement price after he has collected redemption and subscription requests. In particular, the fund manager can commit to setting a su¢ ciently low settlement price following large net redemptions, aiming to induce patient investors not to redeem their shares early. Within the context of our model, this can make a fund that uses swing pricing immune to the risk of self-ful…lling runs.
Lemma 9 There are (su¢ ciently low) settlement prices such that no patient fund investor redeems its shares at date 1, even if it believes that other patient fund investors will redeem their shares at date 1.
Proof. Suppose each patient fund investor believes that a share of =S 0 other patient fund investors will redeem their shares, and that the fund manager sets a settlement price of _ s 1 should net redemptions be equal to S 0 + . Then each patient investor anticipates that if he redeems his share, he obtains a payo¤ of _ s 1 (1 ) R=p after reinvesting the redemption proceeds in the market if he stays with the fund, he obtains a payo¤ given by (22),
If _ s 1 < s 2 , each patient fund investor strictly prefers to remain invested with the fund. Positive values that satisfy _ s 1 < s 2 exist because s 2 (0) > 0, and @s 2 =@s 1 < 0. In practice, the scope for swing pricing to prevent self-ful…lling runs is more limited than Lemma 9 suggests. For one, the fund manager would need to be able to correctly assess the share of investors that are liquidity constrained ( ). In our framework, the fund manager knows , so he can commit to lowering the settlement price whenever net redemptions exceed without any negative impact on investors'utility. In practice, however, is stochastic. In this case, any commitment to lower the settlement price when net redemptions are unusually large comes at a cost: cash-constrained fund investors would su¤er from receiving only a low settlement price if is higher than what the fund manager believes it to be.
Discussion
In this section, we assess how relaxing some of the main assumptions of the model might a¤ect our results. First, we assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty in the model. All prices, and the share of cash-constrained investors, are known. This implies that fund managers can perfectly insure against redemptions by holding a liquidity bu¤er that is equal to the amount paid out to redeeming investors. Nevertheless, we can provide an interesting characterisation of optimal swing pricing policies. The reason is that the marginal cost and bene…ts of varying the settlement price are in ‡uenced by the size of redemptions and trading frictions, even if, in equilibrium, there is no need to trade. That said, our framework may underestimate the leeway that funds have in swinging the settlement price (ie the width of the no-arbitrage interval, (34)). If the fund manager had private information about the realisation of a shock to the (aggregate) redemption requests his fund experiences, he would only ensure that no arbitrage opportunities arise in expectation over those redemption requests other agents believe possible. This is evidently a less binding constraint than the one which holds in our case, where the fund manager ensures that no arbitrage opportunities arise for a known value of redemption requests. Whether the fund manager would exploit that additional leeway is a di¤erent question; for example, he might opt for settlement prices to be less sensitive to redemptions in order to reduce the volatility of consumption of impatient investors.
Second, by assuming that funds are small, we abstract from the in ‡uence a fund's trading may have on the market price itself. A fund that internalises its own impact on the market price would swing the settlement price more aggressively than in our solution in order to further reduce the amount it needs to trade and keep its price impact minimal. Allowing the fund to be large enough to impact the market price would therefore work in the same direction as an increase in trading costs: that is, it would likely reduce the unconstrained optimal settlement price,ŝ, and widen the no-arbitrage interval, (34).
Finally, we assume that trades and share orders are submitted simultaneously and also settle instantly. Depending on the assets the fund invests in, cut-o¤ times for orders and settlement times may di¤er, and it may take time to …nd a counterparty in the asset market. These timing di¤erences introduce additional frictions that, in practice, further increase the ability of fund managers to swing the settlement price.
Conclusion
Investors rely on …nancial intermediaries as a source of liquidity. Just like banks, open-end mutual funds o¤er this liquidity insurance. Even though they invest in comparatively illiquid securities, they typically grant their investors the right to redeem their shares on a daily basis. We assess the scope of swing pricing to manage the associated liquidity risk. Swing pricing, to be introduced in the US from late 2018 onwards, allows funds to settle investor orders at a price di¤erent from the fund's net asset value (NAV). Yet in contrast to other redemption charges, the swing pricing adjustment depends on the amount of net redemption requests.
We study swing pricing in a Diamond/Dybvig-style model with costly trading. We show that the fund manager sets a settlement price that passes on some but not all trading costs to its redeeming investors. Trading costs open a window within which a fund manager adjusts (swings) the settlement price to o¤er better insurance of liquidity risks than the market. The price adjustment remains in a bound which increases with trading costs and in the share of investors that seek liquidity. This result is in line with the observation that in practice, fund managers swing the settlement price only by a few percentage points around the NAV. At the same time, trading costs also justify why the fund manager would consider swinging the settlement price. Trading costs lower the marginal revenue from selling assets and raise the marginal costs of investing funds. As a result, a fund manager lowers the settlement price when redemptions or trading costs are higher, and vice versa when they are lower.
We also derive optimal settlement prices in response to unanticipated shocks. Unanticipated increases in the share of liquidity-constrained investors and in the cost of trading in the asset market both lower the optimal settlement price. The fund's NAV per share falls by less relative to a fund that does not swing its settlement price. In our companion paper, where we compare the performance of funds that are permitted to use swing pricing with that of funds that are not, we …nd evidence that is consistent with these results.
Finally, we show that, within our theoretical framework, swing pricing can prevent self-ful…lling runs on the fund. However, in practice, the scope for swing pricing to prevent self-ful…lling runs is more limited, primarily because the share of liquidity-constrained investors is di¢ cult to assess.
An interesting avenue for future research is to add a richer set of shocks to the model. This would allow, for example, investigating external e¤ects of a fund's swing pricing policy on the market. 9 References 10 Annex 10.1 Notation k net redemptions by liquidity-unconstrained households invested in fund k. A negative value means that the fund experiences net subscriptions. s 1;k price at which fund k settles share subscriptions at date 1. s 2;k fund k's payouts per share in the …nal period k fund k's swing factor ! 0;k share of fund k's assets invested at date 0 in storage (the fund's liquid asset bu¤er) p market price of claims on the long-term technology at date 1 trading cost. Sellers receive (1 ) p per unit sold; buyers receive 1 units of the asset per p units of the endowment good. S 0;k number of shares fund k issued at date 0 (equal to the units of the endowment good k collects at date 0) c I A consumption of impatient risk-averse households (which, in equilibrium, invest in the fund) c P A consumption of patient risk-averse households (which, in equilibrium, invest in the fund) c N consumption of risk-neutral households (which, in equilibrium, invest in the long-term technology)
share of risk-neutral households among all households likelihood of becoming impatient (of having to consume at date 1) u A utility function of risk-averse households u N utility of risk-neutral households k fund k's redemption requests from patient households at date 1 10.2 The no-arbitrage interval in terms of the settlement price (proof of Lemma 5)
Proof. The proof proceeds by equating the returns of date-1 investments in fund shares with those of date-1 investments in claims on the long-term technology. Because the fund's return is a function of its assets per share, whose expression depends on whether the fund purchases or sells assets, the derivations generate two no-arbitrage intervals, one for the case in which the fund sells assets, s Lj >^ ; s Hj >^ , and one for the case in which it purchases assets at date 1, s Lj <^ ; s Hj <^ .
1. Settlement prices at the lower bound for the fund's return (an upper bound to s 1;k ). At this bound, the returns of both date-1 investments are equal if s 2;k =s 1;k = (1 ) R=p (see Lemma 4). We omit in the following the subscipt k that indicates the fund.
If >^ , then the returns of the two date-1 investments are equal if s 1 = s Hj >^ , where s Hj >^ is given by
where the second line follows after solving (42) for s Hj >^ .
If <^ , then the returns of the two date-1 investments are equal if s 1 = s Hj <^ , where s Hj <^ is given by
s Hj >^ is strictly decreasing in patient investors'net redemptions, , and reaches a maximum for the lowest at which the fund would sell assets in response to a marginal increase in s Hj >^ ( =^ ). Entering this value of into (42) yields the maximum of s Hj >^ ,
Correspondingly, s Hj >^ reaches its minimum when net redemptions are maximal (
2. Settlement prices at the upper bound for the fund's return (a lower bound to s 1 ). At this bound, the returns of both date-1 investments are equal if s 2;k =s 1;k = R= ((1 ) p) (see Lemma 4). We omit in the following the subscipt k.
If >^ , then the returns of both date-1 investments are equal if s 1 = s Lj >^ , where s Lj >^ is given by
where the second line follows after solving (42) for s Lj >^ .
If <^ , then the returns of both date-1 investments are equal if s 1 = s Lj <^ , where s Lj <^ is given by
s Lj <^ is strictly decreasing in patient investors'net redemptions (strictly increasing in asset purchases), , and reaches a minimum for the smallest at which the fund would just purchase assets
The interval (32) is then constructed using the bounds (49) and (43), while the interval (33) is the result of combining (51) and (45).
Optimal liquidity bu¤er
Lemma 10 The fund manager chooses a liquidity bu¤ er equal to equilibrium redemptions:
Proof. Fund manager k solves max ! 0;k U where, using the fact that impatient households invested in the fund in equilibrium consume c I A;k = s 1;k and patient households c
The proof proceeds by evaluating the …rst derivatives to the fund's problem. (We omit in the following the subscipt k.) The optimal settlement price s 1 is de…ned by intervals (see 12), so we need to compute the …rst-order conditions separately for each interval, depending on whether s 1 is at the upper bound of the no-arbitrage interval, at the lower bound, or in the interior. For each interval, we need to consider the case in which the fund sells assets separately from that in which the fund purchases assets. The reason is that the fund's assets per share at date 2 (equal to s 2 ) are de…ned separately for each case, re ‡ecting the discontinuity of s 2 introduced by the bid-ask spread. 1. Supposeŝ < s H , whereŝ is the "unconstrained" optimal solution for the settlement price given by (24). Then s 1 = s H . If s 1 = s H , then s 2 = s 1 (1 ) R=p and the fund manager's …rst-order condition is if >^ , such that the fund would sell assets to meet redemption requests, the …rst derivative is, using the de…nition of s Hj >^ in (43),
The sign of @s Hj >^ =@! 0 follows from p < 1= (1 ). That is, if, for a given ! 0 , the fund would sell assets, the fund manager strictly prefers to raise the liquid asset bu¤er.
if <^ , the …rst derivative is, using the de…nition of s Hj <^ in (45),
The sign of @s Hj <^ =@! 0 follows from p > 1 . That is if, for a given ! 0 , the fund has spare liquidity after servicing net redemptions, the fund manager strictly prefers to lower the liquid asset bu¤er.
As a result, if
)p and the fund manager's …rst-order condition is if >^ , such that the fund would sell assets to meet redemption requests, the …rst derivative is, using the de…nition of s Lj >^ in (49),
The sign of @s Lj >^ =@! 0 follows from p < 1= (1 ). That is, if, for a given ! 0 , the fund would sell assets, the fund manager strictly prefers to raise the liquid asset bu¤er.
if <^ , the …rst derivative is, using the de…nition of s Lj <^ in (49),
if >^ , equivalently ! 0 < s 1 , the fund needs to sell assets in response to a marginal increase in the settlement price, and s 2 = s 2j >^ . The response of s 2j >^ , de…ned in (22), to an increase in the liquidity bu¤er is
Entering this into the …rst derivative of the fund's objective function yields
The last equality follows because the fund manager optimally chooses the settlement price, hence u 0 s 1j >^ 1 p Ru 0 s 2j >^ = 0 (see (13) in proposition 1). The sign follows from p > 1 .
if <^ , equivalently ! 0 > s 1 , then s 2j <^ , de…ned in (23). Its response to an increase in the liquidity bu¤er is
The last equality follows because the fund manager optimally chooses the settlement price, hence u 0 s 1j <^ 1 (1 )p Ru 0 s 2j <^ = 0. The sign follows from p < 1= (1 ).
First-period choices and existence of equilibrium
Lemma 11 A necessary condition for the existence of the equilibrium is s 1 1 Proof. Suppose s 1 < 1. A risk-averse household's equilibrium utility is
If it deviated to storage at date 0 and invested in fund shares at date 1, its utility would be strictly higher at u (1) + (1 ) u (s 2 =s 1 ): a contradiction to s 1 < 1 in an equilibrium in which all risk-averse households subscribe to fund shares at date 0.
Lemma 12 shows that p S 1 is also a su¢ cient condition for risk-neutral households to prefer investing in the long-term technology.
Lemma 12 At date 0, a risk-neutral household prefers to invest in the long-term technology if s 1 > 1.
Proof. s 1 1 implies that the risk-neutral household prefers investing in the fund over storage. By construction of s 1 , if invested in the fund at date 0, it prefers to remain with the fund at date 1 to earn s 2 . Because s 1 1, this would be less than its equilibrium payo¤, R (see (16)).
In contrast, s 1 1 is not su¢ cient for risk-averse households to prefer investing in fund shares. A risk-averse household that deviates to investing in the long-term technology earns (1 ) p < s 1 if impatient and R > s 2 if patient. If s 1 1, the variance of its equilibrium payo¤ is therefore smaller than the variance of this deviation payo¤. At the same time, the expected equilibrium payo¤ from investing in fund shares is smaller than the payo¤ earned from deviating to investing in the long-term technology. To see this, notice that his expected payo¤ is
where the …rst equality follows from inserting the equilibrium expression for s 2 , given by (16). The expected payo¤ of investing in the long-term technology is
The expected payo¤ from investing in shares is smaller if
1. This suggests that for a su¢ ciently large degree of risk aversion, a risk-averse household will not deviate to investing into the long-term technology at date 0. Lemma 13 shows how the no-deviation condition
translates into a condition on households' risk aversion in the context of a CRRA utility function and shows existence for a few plausible parameter calibrations.
Lemma 13 Suppose u (c) = c 1 a = (1 a).
1. The optimal settlement price is
2. s 1 > 1 if and only if a > ln R p(1 ) = ln R, ie if households are su¢ ciently risk averse.
Proof. We …rst derive expression (64) for the optimal settlement price and then consider the case that it lies in the interior region.
1. Using CRRA utility, the optimality condition (13) specialises tô
Re-arranging terms yields 1
Solving for s 1 then yieldsŝ, which is equal to the optimal settlement price in the middle interval of (64). Notice that, in equilibrium,
. Solving s 1 = s H and s 1 = s L yields the bounds to a for the di¤erent intervals of (64).ŝ s H is equivalent to
Taking inverses and re-arranging terms yields
Taking logs then yields the optimal settlement price in the top interval of (64). The proof for the optimal settlement price in the bottom interval of (64) is analogous.
3. Existence: we only show here that there are plausible parameter values such that p S > 1 and that risk-averse households prefer subscribing to fund shares at date 0 instead of investing in the longterm technology, ie that the no-deviation condition (63) holds. For example, for a return of the long-term technology of R = 1:1, a mid-market price of p = 1, a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of a = 2, trading costs of = 0:05, and a share of liquidity-constrained fund investors of = 0:1, Another parameter combination for which the same type of equilibrium exists is: R = 1:05, p = 1, a = 2, = 0:03, and = 0:05. For larger degrees of risk aversion, an equilibrium exists in which the settlement price is at the upper bound of the no-arbitrage interval, s 1 = s H .
10.5 Properties of the equilibrium settlement price and the swing factor 10.
Payouts to impatient vs payouts to patient investors
If s 1 =ŝ, (13) states that u 0 (s 1 )
Then u 00 < 0 implies s 1 < s 2 because R > (1 ) p.
Bounds for the optimal swing factor
Inserting the corresponding bounds for the settlement price, s L and s H , into the expression for the swing factor, (2), yields
For illustration, using the same calibration as in the proof of Lemma 13, = 0:05 and = 0:1, we have 2 [ :045; +0:047].
Larger trading costs
The response of the bounds of the no-arbitrage intervals to larger trading costs (@s H =@ > 0, @s L =@ < 0) can be seen directly by inspecting (14) and (15). If = 0, both collapse to a single value, the fund's net asset value per share, ! 0 + (1 ! 0 ) (1 ) p. The response ofŝ can be derived by totally di¤erentiating the fund manager's …rst-order condition, (13). Denote (13) 
A greater likelihood of becoming impatient
The response of the bounds of the no-arbitrage intervals to a greater likelihood of becoming impatient, , is
( (1 ) (1 ) + p) 2 < 0
The response ofŝ can be derived by totally di¤erentiating the fund manager's …rst order condition, (66), as above, using
Response to an unanticipated increase in trading frictions
The unanticipated increase in trading frictions is public information at the start of date 1. The fund manager maximises 
where the last line follows under the assumption that patient investors remain with the fund (we show below that this is the case). The optimal settlement price following the unanticipated change in is given by the …rst-order constraint @U @s 1 = u 0 (s 1 ) + (1 ) @s 2 @s 1 u 0 (s 2 ) = 0
Assets per share at date 2 are if s 1 ! 0 , the fund sells assets in response to a marginally increasing settlement price, and s 2 is given by (22) evaluated at = 0. Then
if s 1 < ! 0 , the fund purchases fewer assets in response to a marginally increasing settlement price, and s 2 is given by (23) evaluated at = 0. Then 2. Suppose instead that s 1 < ! 0 and that s 1 s L , where s L is given by (15). Then the solution to the fund manager's …rst-order condition is s 1 , where where the sign follows because s 1 < ! 0 . Then @G=@ < 0 and ds 1 =d < 0. As a result, following an unanticipated increase in , s 1 < s 1 . This implies that the fund retains ! 0 s 1 in cash. This raises patient investors'payo¤ above what they would obtain in equilibrium, in which they do not trade. Patient fund investors therefore prefer to stay with the fund. Correspondingly, investors outside the fund have no incentive to purchase if s 1 s L .
